Files
go-winio/pkg/security/grantvmgroupaccess_test.go
T
Sebastiaan van Stijn 92c1f57e85 switch back from golang.org/x/sys/execabs to os/exec (go1.19)
This reverts commit f2a56450f4, which switched
from os/exec to the golang.org/x/sys/execabs package to mitigate security
issues (mainly on Windows) with lookups resolving to binaries in the current
directory.

from the go1.19 release notes https://go.dev/doc/go1.19#os-exec-path

> ## PATH lookups
>
> Command and LookPath no longer allow results from a PATH search to be found
> relative to the current directory. This removes a common source of security
> problems but may also break existing programs that depend on using, say,
> exec.Command("prog") to run a binary named prog (or, on Windows, prog.exe) in
> the current directory. See the os/exec package documentation for information
> about how best to update such programs.
>
> On Windows, Command and LookPath now respect the NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath
> environment variable, making it possible to disable the default implicit search
> of “.” in PATH lookups on Windows systems.

Signed-off-by: Sebastiaan van Stijn <github@gone.nl>
2024-04-22 20:31:03 +02:00

117 lines
2.9 KiB
Go

//go:build windows
// +build windows
package security
import (
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"regexp"
"strings"
"testing"
)
const (
vmAccountName = `NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\\Virtual Machines`
vmAccountSID = "S-1-5-83-0"
)
// TestGrantVmGroupAccess verifies for the three case of a file, a directory,
// and a file in a directory that the appropriate ACEs are set, including
// inheritance in the second two examples. These are the expected ACES. Is
// verified by running icacls and comparing output.
//
// File:
// S-1-15-3-1024-2268835264-3721307629-241982045-173645152-1490879176-104643441-2915960892-1612460704:(R,W)
// S-1-5-83-1-3166535780-1122986932-343720105-43916321:(R,W)
//
// Directory:
// S-1-15-3-1024-2268835264-3721307629-241982045-173645152-1490879176-104643441-2915960892-1612460704:(OI)(CI)(R,W)
// S-1-5-83-1-3166535780-1122986932-343720105-43916321:(OI)(CI)(R,W)
//
// File in directory (inherited):
// S-1-15-3-1024-2268835264-3721307629-241982045-173645152-1490879176-104643441-2915960892-1612460704:(I)(R,W)
// S-1-5-83-1-3166535780-1122986932-343720105-43916321:(I)(R,W)
func TestGrantVmGroupAccess(t *testing.T) {
f, err := os.CreateTemp("", "gvmgafile")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer func() {
f.Close()
os.Remove(f.Name())
}()
d := t.TempDir()
find, err := os.Create(filepath.Join(d, "find.txt"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer find.Close()
if err := GrantVmGroupAccess(f.Name()); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := GrantVmGroupAccess(d); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
verifyVMAccountDACLs(t,
f.Name(),
[]string{`(R)`},
)
// Two items here:
// - One explicit read only.
// - Other applies to this folder, subfolders and files
// (OI): object inherit
// (CI): container inherit
// (IO): inherit only
// (GR): generic read
//
// In properties for the directory, advanced security settings, this will
// show as a single line "Allow/Virtual Machines/Read/Inherited from none/This folder, subfolder and files
verifyVMAccountDACLs(t,
d,
[]string{`(R)`, `(OI)(CI)(IO)(GR)`},
)
verifyVMAccountDACLs(t,
find.Name(),
[]string{`(I)(R)`},
)
}
func verifyVMAccountDACLs(t *testing.T, name string, permissions []string) {
t.Helper()
cmd := exec.Command("icacls", name)
outb, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
out := string(outb)
for _, p := range permissions {
// Avoid '(' and ')' being part of match groups
p = strings.Replace(p, "(", "\\(", -1)
p = strings.Replace(p, ")", "\\)", -1)
nameToCheck := vmAccountName + ":" + p
sidToCheck := vmAccountSID + ":" + p
rxName := regexp.MustCompile(nameToCheck)
rxSID := regexp.MustCompile(sidToCheck)
matchesName := rxName.FindAllStringIndex(out, -1)
matchesSID := rxSID.FindAllStringIndex(out, -1)
if len(matchesName) != 1 && len(matchesSID) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("expected one match for %s or %s\n%s", nameToCheck, sidToCheck, out)
}
}
}